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CASE NOTES

ditioned on any prior demand for trial, as it is the state that has breached
its duty to provide a speedy trial.7 In Ex Parte Trulg the court stated:
The rule is that the defendant need not take any affirmative action. The duty
and responsibility of providing the accused with a speedy trial is on the officers
of the state.9

And in Zehrlaut v. State' ° it was said:
[The] statute . . . casts no burden on the defendant, but casts an imperative
duty on the state and its officers, trial courts and prosecuting attorneys, to see
that a defendant ... is brought to trial agreeably [with this section of the constitution and its implementary statute]"

Although the decisions which hold no demand is necessary speak of constitutional safeguards in relation to a speedy trial, it appears that many
12
of the cases were actually decided on the basis of a statute of limitations.
The court, in the instant case, followed the rule that a demand must be
made. The decision contains no discussion of the opposing view. The
court did, however, express a strong opinion as to the length of the delay

by saying:
These proceedings present a remarkable chronology which we hope will never
be duplicated in the annals of New Jersey criminal jurisprudence. No explanation was given, but, in lieu thereof, an apology is submitted for the unprecedented delay of nearly a quarter of a century between arraignment and prosecution. This dismaying procrastination stands as an inerasable blot on our record of
the expeditious administration of criminal justice as we proudly thought it had
existed. 1"
7 People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E. 2d 891 (1955); Zehrlaut v. State, 230 Ind.
175, 102 N.E. 2d 203 (1951); Davidson v. Garfield, 221 Iowa 424, 265 N.W. 645 (1936)
(Overruled by Pines v. District Court, 233 Iowa 1284, 10 N.W. 2d 574 (1943)); State v.
Carrillo, 41 Ariz. 170, 16 P. 2d 965 (1932); Ex Parte Trull, 135 Kan. 165, 298 Pac. 775
(1931); Ex Parte Chalfant, 81 W. Va. 93, 93 S.E. 1032 (1917); State v. Rosenberg, 71
Ore. 389, 142 Pac. 624 (1914). In Shafer v. State, 430 Ohio App. 493, 183 N.E. 774 (1932)
the court stated the rule that no demand for a trial must be made. However, the court
held that under the circumstances the eighteen month delay was not a denial of the right
to a speedy trial.
8 135 Kan. 165, 298 Pac. 775 (1931).
10 230 Ind. 175, 102 N.E. 2d 203 (1951).

9 Ibid., at 167, 776.

11 Ibid., at 177, 204.
But cf. Shafer v. State, 430 Ohio App. 493, 183 N.E. 774 (1932).
1 25 N.J. 104,110,135 A. 2d 321, 325 (1957).

12

CRIMINAL LAW-WIRETAP EVIDENCE PROCURED
SOLELY BY STATE OFFICIALS INADMISSIBLE
IN FEDERAL COURT
The New York Police, suspecting that Benanti was dealing illegally in
narcotics, obtained a warrant (in accordance with state law)I authorizing
'N.Y. Const. Art. 1, S 12; N.Y. Code of Criminal Procedure (McKinney, 1948),
S813-a.
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them to tap the telephone wires of a bar which Benanti was known to
frequent. By means of this wiretap, the police overheard a conversation
between Benanti and another in which it was said that "eleven pieces"
were to be transported that night. Acting on this information, the police
followed and stopped a car driven by Benanti's brother. No narcotics were
found, but in the car there were eleven cans of alcohol without the federal tax stamps required by law. The brother was arrested and the alcohol
turned over to federal authorities. At the trial in the Federal District Court
a state police officer testified that the information gained by the wiretap
caused them to intercept the car which contained the alcohol. Benanti's
motion to suppress the evidence was denied and he was convicted of the
illegal possession and transportation of distilled spirits without tax stamps
affixed thereto .2 His conviction was affirmed3 on the ground that while the
action of the state officials violated Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act, 4 the evidence obtained from the violation was still admissible.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that, if the evidence
was obtained by means forbidden by Section 605, whether by state or
federal agents, it is inadmissible in a federal court. Benanti v. United States,
355 U.S. 96 (1957).
The use of wiretap evidence first came to the Supreme Court's attention in 1928. In that year the court held in Olmstead v. United States,5
that use in evidence in a criminal trial in a federal court of an incriminating
telephone conversation voluntarily conducted by the accused and secretly
overheard from a tapped wire by a government officer, does not violate
the Fourth or Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The
court further held that in order to violate the Constitution in such a case
there must be a physical trespass to the premises. The court went on to
say that it was within the province of Congress, through appropriate legislation, to protect the privacy of telephone messages. The dissenting opinion by Justices Holmes and Brandeis indicated that there was a need for
federal legislation in this field. They were of the opinion that wiretapping
was an invasion of personal security, personal liberty, private property,
2 26 U.S.C.A. S 5008(b) (1) (1942).
3 United States v. Benanti, 244 F. 2d 389 (C.A. 2d, 1957).
4 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (Supp., 1956), which states: "[N]o person, not being authorized
by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence,

contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted communication to
any person. . ... No person having received such intercepted communication or having
become acquainted with the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the
same or any part thereof, knowing that such information was so obtained shall divulge
or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or

any part thereof, or use the same or any information therein contained for his own
benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto .... "
5 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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and that it should be strictly controlled, if not prohibited entirely.
As a result of the Olmstead case, Congress, in 1934, passed Section 605
of the Federal Communications Act, which made it a crime to "intercept
and divulge" any communication whether interstate or intrastate. 6 Under
this section wiretapping is not an offense, but interception and disclosure
7
of the contents of the message constitute the crime.
In Nardone v. United States," the rule was adopted by the federal
courts that evidence procured by federal officials in the tapping of wires
was a violation of the Communications Act of 1934, and is inadmissible.
This applies not only to intercepted conversations themselves, but also to
evidence procured through the use of knowledge gained from such conversations. This case clearly sets forth the rule that evidence obtained by
wiretapping by a federal agent is not admissible in a federal court.
A different result is reached when evidence is obtained in violation of
Section 605 by state officials for a state prosecution. In Schwartz v. Texas, 9
the defendant was convicted of robbery in a Texas State Court upon evidence obtained by wiretapping. The defendant claimed that Section 605
made the records of intercepted telephone conversations without the defendant's consent inadmissible. The United States Supreme Court said:
We hold that § 605 applies only to the exclusion in federal court proceedings
of evidence obtained and sought to be divulged in violation thereof; it does not
exclude such evidence in state court proceedings. 10
Since the Federal Communications Act does not apply to the states,
there was nothing to prevent state officials from turning over to federal
authorities evidence obtained by wiretapping. This is the so-called "SilverPlatter Doctrine" which originated in a 1927 case11 relating to search and
seizure. This case held that if the federal authorities took no part in procuring the illegally obtained evidence turned over by state officials, it was
admissible in a federal court.
Therefore, it was urged in the Benanti case that so long as the wiretapping occurred without the participation or knowledge of the federal law
enforcement officers the evidence should be admitted in the federal court.
The federal government urged that it was without fault and should not be
handicapped in its prosecution of violators of the federal law. The Supreme Court did not agree and said that although Section 605 was not
violated by the wiretap itself, it was violated when the intercepted communication was disclosed to the jury. This Section expressly forbids di6

Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).

7 United States v. Coplon, 185 F. 2d 629 (C.A. 2d, 1950).

8 302 U.S. 379 (1937).

9 344 U.S. 199 (1952).

11 Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).

10 Ibid., at 203.
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vulgence of the intercepted communication or, "the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or
use the same or any information therein contained for his own benefit or

1 2
for the benefit of another not entitled thereto."' The Supreme Court hav-

ing found that Section 605 was violated said, "evidence obtained by means
forbidden by Section 605 whether by state or federal agents, is inadmissible in a federal court."'18
The Supreme Court in the Benanti case has abolished the "SilverPlatter Doctrine" in relation to wiretap evidence. This construction of
Section 605 is consistent with the14spirit of the Holmes and Brandeis dissent in Olmstead v. United States.
12
13

Authority cited note 4 supra.
Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 100 (1957).

14 277 U.S. 438 (1928).

DISCOVERY-INSURANCE COVERAGE SUBJECT TO
PRE-TRIAL INTERROGATORIES
Plaintiff, during the pendency of a personal injury action, requested the
defendant to answer discovery interrogatories which would disclose the
name of the defendant's insurer, if any; and if there was one, the policy
limits for each person. The defendant refused to answer and the lower
court ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to receive answers to the interrogatories. The defendant then brought a mandamus proceeding to compel the Circuit Court judge to expunge from the record the orders requiring petitioner to answer. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the writ
and held that discovery interrogatories respecting the existence and
amount of defendant's insurance were relevant to the merits of the matter
in litigation as provided in Section 58 (1) of the Civil Practice Act and the
2d 231, 145 N.E. 2d 588
Supreme Court Rules.' People v. Fisher, 12 Ill.
(1957).

The principal issues raised are: (1) How broad is the scope of discov' Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 110, S 58(1). "Discovery, admissions of fact and of genuine-

ness of documents and answers to interrogatories shall be in accordance with rules."
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 110, S 101.19-4 says, "(1) Discovery Depositions-Upon a discovery deposition, the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged,
relating to the merits of the matter in litigation, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the examining party or of any other party, including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition and location of any documents or tangible things and the
identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts.... Ill. Rev. Stat.
(1957) c. 110, § 101.19-10 says, ..... (2) Discovery Depositions-Discovery depositions
may be used only: (a) for the purpose of impeaching the testimony of deponent as a
witness in the same manner and to the same extent as any inconsistent statement made
by a witness; or (b) as an admission made by a party or by an officer or agent of a party
in the same manner and to the same extent as any other admission made by that person;
(c) if otherwise admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule ......

